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Notes
Teaching the Children "Appropriately:"
Publicly Financed Private Education
Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act
Florence County School DistrictFour v. Carter'
I. INTRODUCTION

The issue of educating the child with disabilities is a relatively new one
in the scope of civil rights law. First addressed by Congress in 1975, the
rights of the disabled child to a free and appropriate education are just now
being defined with some particularity. This Note addresses one of the most
important aspects of the right to a public education: Who will foot the bill?
Clearly, the goal of educating all disabled children is an admirable one.
What rational person would deny a child, no matter how disabled he or she
is, the opportunity to gain an education on equal footing with his or her peers?
Virtually every child can gain benefit from some time in a classroom, and
every child deserves the chance to reach his or her full potential. Yet with

admirable goals come astronomical costs.

A child with disabilities is

guaranteed by federal law a free, appropriate public education, but the cost of
such a program often comes at the expense of "normal" children in the same
classroom who are perhaps held back from achieving because of school
district funds diverted for disabled education, or the diverted attention of the
teacher.
The high cost of disabled education was the focus of the United States
Supreme Court's latest foray into the rights of the disabled child. Shannon
Carter suffered from a learning disability that prevented her from learning as
efficiently as other children her age. Her parents were unhappy with the
educational offerings her local school provided, so they placed her in a
private, specialized environment where she would get proper attention as well
as the best education available. On behalf of Shannon, her parents then sued
the school district for reimbursement of tuition and costs.
This Note traces the history of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act, the right of parents to unilaterally withdraw their child from a public
school and place the child in a private school, and the duty of the state to pay

1. 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).
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the bill in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Florence County School
Districtv. Carter.3
I1. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Individuals with DisabilitiesEducation Act
First introduced in the 93rd Congress on January 1, 1974, the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA" or "the Act") was designed to "assure
that full educational opportunities are available to all handicapped children."3
The act's legislative history explicitly identifies an influential force behind the
provisions as a series of "right to education" cases beginning with Brown v.
Board of Education.4 Although the Supreme Court had not faced the issue
of whether disabled children have a constitutional right to education, 5 the
Senate report accompanying the act recognized courts in several states had
established that very guarantee.6 Specifically, the Senate focused on two
lower federal court cases -decided in 1971 and 1972.' Relying on the Equal

2. Id.
3. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975), reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1427. The bill was introduced and passed into law as the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act in 1975. Following amendments in 1990,
the name was changed to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Education
of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1103
(effective Oct. 1, 1990). Several other substantive changes were made to the act with
the 1990 amendments, the most significant of which was to substitute the phrase
"children with disabilities" for "handicapped children." Id. For consistency, this Note
will refer to the IDEA throughout.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Note, Enforcingthe Right to an "Appropriate"Eduction: The Educationfor
all HandicappedChildrenAct of 1975, 92 HARv. L. REv. 1103, 1104 (1979).
6. S. REP. No. 168, supranote 3, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1431 ("In recent years
decisions in more than 36 court cases in the States have recognized the rights of
handicapped children to an appropriate education.").
7. Millsv. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding under
the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitutionthat "no
[handicapped] child eligible for a publicly-supported education in the District of
Columbia shall be excluded from a regular public school assignent... unless such
child is provided adequate alternative educational services suited to the child's needs);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children ("PARC") v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp.
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (enjoining the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from applying
a statute relating to the postponement or denial of any mentally retarded child access
to a free public education and training), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution, those
cases "guarantee the right to free publicly-supported education for handicapped
children."
In passing the IDEA, Congress found that of the 8 million disabled
children below the age of twenty-one in 1974-1975, "only 3.9 million...
[were] receiving an appropriate education. 1.75 million handicapped children
[were] receiving no educational services at all, and 2.5 million handicapped
children [were] receiving an inappropriate education."" The IDEA was
designed to remedy this problem by helping to finance state programs and
requiring states to provide some level of educational opportunities to all
handicapped children as well as procedural safeguards for parents in the
evaluation and placement of their children."
The crux of the IDEA is found in the statute's purpose: "to assure that

all children with disabilities have available to them .

..

a free appropriate

public education" ("FAPE"). A state must demonstrate it has met this free
appropriate education standard, defined in section 1401(a)(18), 2 to assure
eligibility for federal funding assistance for the state. 3 For seven years

Although the United States Supreme Court has never specifically held a disabled
child enjoys a constitutional guarantee to a public education, the Court appears to have
implicitly acknowledged that right in Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
In Rowley the Court noted the IDEA provided the guarantee of a public education, but
imposed no substantive obligation on the state beyond the requirement of equal access.
Neither PARC, or Mills, nor the Act itself requires any particular substantive level of
education. However, the Rowley Court noted the significance of these two cases:
"The fact that both PARC and Mills are discussed at length in the legislative Reports
[of the IDEA] suggests that the principles which they established are the principles
which, to a significant extent, guided the drafters of the Act." Id. at 192.
8. See S. REP. No. 168, supranote 3, at 6, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1430.
9. S. REP. No. 168, supranote 3, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1432.
10. S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 8, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1432.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993).
12. The Act defines free appropriate public education as
special education and related services that:
(A) have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and
direction, and without charge,
(B) meet the standards of the State educational agency,
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school
education in the State involved, and
(D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program...
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18) (1988).
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (Supp. V 1993). The requisite features of the plan for
a state desiring participation in IDEA are found in 20 U.S.C. § 1413, the assurances
necessary in a state's application are found in § 1414, and the required procedural
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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following the IDEA's enactment, only the lower courts addressed the meaning
of "appropriate" education. Then, in 1982, the United States Supreme Court
heard arguments in Board of Education v. Rowley. 4
An eight-year-old deaf child was the plaintiff in the Supreme Court's first
opportunity to hear a case involving a disabled child's right to an education.
Amy Rowley had sued the Hendrick Hudson Central School District in
Peekskill, New York, alleging her right to receive a qualified sign-language
interpreter in all her classes.15 The district court held, 6 and a divided panel
of the court of appeals affirmed,17 that because of Amy's great potential
compared to her average achievement she was not receiving a FAPE. Stating
there was no statutory definition of appropriate education, the district court
defined it as "an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with
the opportunity provided to other children."'" In contrast to that mandate,
the school district had provided Rowley with only an "adequate" eduction and,
because she was an above average student, the court ordered the school district

to provide her with a sign language interpreter in the classroom to allow her
to reach her full potential as a student. 9 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the lower courts' interpretation of the Act.2"
The Court disagreed with the district court's finding that the Act itself did
not expressly define "free appropriate public education."21 In fact, the Court
found that section 1401(a)(18) expressly defines the phrase. Though that

safeguards for the parents and the children are located in § 1415. 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1413-1415 (1988).
The state must demonstrate that it has a policy in effect assuring all handicapped
children the right to a FAPE, tailored to the unique needs of each child by means of

an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP"), prepared by school officials with input from
the child's parents and reviewed at least annually. See infra note 29.
14. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
15. Id. at 184-85.
16. Rowleyv. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 534 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 632 F.2d
945 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.granted,454 U.S. 961 (1981).
17. Rowley v. Board of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.granted,
454 U.S. 961 (1981).
18. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534. The court considered two definitions of the
term "appropriate education." On the one end it could mean adequate, enough to
advance a child from grade to grade. On the other end, it could mean an education
that "enables the handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential." Id. The
standard arrived at, according to the court, was between those two extremes but "more
in keeping with the regulations, with the Equal Protection decisions which motivated
the passage of the Act, and with common sense." Id.
19. Id.
20. 454 U.S. 961 (1981).
21. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185-86.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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definition22 "like many statutory definitions... tends toward the cryptic,"'
the Court embarked on a quest to discover Congress' intent through other
portions of the Act itself as well as its legislative history.24 Instead of an
educational opportunity that would allow Amy to reach her full potential as
a student, the Court held the Act's sole purpose was to open previously closed
public school doors to all handicapped children and provide them with
personalized, individual instruction.' In the Court's view, the Act was not
designed to guarantee any substantive standard as to the level of education to
be provided a child with disabilities, only that some benefit be provided.
According to the Court, the Act was clearly not intended to offer a "potentialmaximizing" education,2 6 but a "basic floor of opportunity," consisting of
access to specialized instruction individually designed for the handicapped
child.27

The Court concluded a state satisfies the requirement of FAPE by
providing educational instruction specially designed to meet the needs of the
child having a disability and such services as are necessaryto permit the child
to benefit educationally from such instruction. 2' Furthermore, if a child is
being educated within a public education classroom, he or she receives
sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA if the
student's individualized education program ("IEP") 2 9 is "reasonably

22. See supra note 12.
23. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.

24. Id. at 188-201. For specific examples in the legislative history see, e.g., id.
at 194 nn.15-18, 201 n.23. The Court also pointed to the Act's definition of
"supportive services," which states "supportive services... as may be required to
assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education." Id. at 188 (citing 20
U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (Supp. V 1993)).
25.
26.
27.
28.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 197 n.21.
Id. at 200.
Id. at 201. The majority was answered by a strong dissentwritten by Justice

White.
This [decision] falls far short of what the Act intended.... The basic floor
of opportunity is instead, as the courts below recognized, intended to
eliminate the effects of the handicap, at least to the extent that the child will

be given an equal opportunity to learn if that is reasonably possible. Amy
Rowley, without a sign-language interpreter, comprehends less than half of
what is said in the classroom-less than half of what normal children
comprehend. This is hardly an equal opportunity to learn, even if Amy

makes passing grades.
Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's dissent was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall.
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (Supp. V 1993). An IEP is to be developed by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from
grade to grade."3 Thus, because Amy performed better than the average
child in school, the Court concluded Amy was receiving an appropriate
education under the IDEA. Therefore, the school was not required to provide
her with a sign-language interpreter."
B. The "Stay Put" Provision and the Burlington Decision
After the Supreme Court's decision in Rowley, parents, school boards,

and courts for the first time had a uniform standard to apply when determining
the needs of a disabled student. The Act provides extensive administrative
appeal procedures to be included in state plans, allowing a child's parents to
challenge the appropriateness of the education and to seek review of any
change in the student's status.32 Furthermore, any party aggrieved by the
state's final determination has the right to bring the case to a competent state
court or United States District Court.3
Under the Act, it is clear the family of a disabled student has a right to
challenge whether instruction is "reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits."34 It is also clear this appeal process could take

local educational agency or school with the parents' input and consent. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(20) (Supp. V 1993). It is a written statement that shall include a statement
of the child's present educational levels as well as the annual goals and objectives of
his or her educational program. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20)(A) & (B) (Supp. V 1993).
The IEP is to state the necessary services to be provided the student along with the
extent to which he or she may participate in regular educational programs. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(20)(C) (Supp. V 1993). The Act requires that each disabled child be
provided with an IEP and that it be reviewed at least annually. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(20)(F) (Supp. V 1993). The IEP's importance is repeatedly stressed in the
statute and the cases interpreting it. It has been called, alternatively, the Act's
"centerpiece" or its "modus operandi." Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ.,
471 U.S. 359, 368 (1985).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204.
Id. at 206-07.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1988).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988).
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 204.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8

6

1995]

Huskey: Huskey: Teaching the Children Appropriately
APPROPRLITE EDUCATION UNDER THE IDEA

months and more likely years.35 What happens to the child in the interim,
while the appeals process is taking place, is much less clear.
On its face, the statute provides for such contingencies. The so called
"stay-put" provision of section 1415(e)(3) states that "[d]uring the pendency
of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section . . . the child shall
remain in the then current educational placement of such child. '36 Parents
who disagreed with their public school's determination of their child's
educational future understandably fought the apparent application of this
provision. On one hand, the Act's goal was clear: to guarantee the child a
free and sufficient education. On the other hand, if parents elected to exercise
their right to challenge what the school deemed appropriate, the stay-put
provision prohibited them from taking their child out of the disagreeable
placement and placing him or her where they believed the child would
Often such an
experience an appropriate educational environment.
and
typically at a
environment could be found only at a private institution,
significantly higher price than a public school.
Parents were faced with a most unfortunate decision: "[G]o along with
the IEP to the detriment of their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay
for what they consider to be the appropriate placement."37 Because a private
school comes with a high price tag, and because (on its face) the stay-put
provision creates a presumption against unilateral private placement by a
parent, the private school option simply did not exist for many students. As
a result, many children had no choice but to remain in an inappropriate

35. By way of example, Florence County School District Four first presented
Shannon Carter's IEP to her parents in May, 1985. Carter,950 F.2d 156, 159 (4th
Cir. 1991). In July, 1986, they had exhausted their state administrative remedies and
filed their suit against the school district in U.S. District Court. Id. Although a three
day trial took place in January, 1988, the district court's final decisionwas not handed
down until February 6, 1991. Brief for Respondents at 11, n.10, Carter (No.
91-1523). It was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in November, 1991,
Carter,950 F.2d at 156, argued before the United States Supreme Court on October

6, 1993, and the final opinionwas issued onNovember 9, eight and a half years after
the process began. Carter,114 S.Ct. at 361. Shannon Carter graduated from Trident
in 1988. Carter,950 F.2d at 158.
See also Burlington, 471 U.S. at 361 ("Where as in the present case review of
a contested IEP takes years to run its course-years critical to the child's development

. "). The Burlington decision, discussed infra, began with a third grade student's
IEP in July, 1979, and ended after four published opinions with a landmark Supreme

Court decision in April, 1985.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).
37. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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educational setting and, at least in regards to these children, it appeared the
Act's goal had ultimately failed.38
The IDEA's goal of an appropriate education for all disabled children is
primarily to be met through placements in public schools,39 with the child
participating in "mainstreamed" environments as much as possible.4"
However, there is no doubt the Act contemplates private placement where
appropriate public placement is unavailable. 1
If a public school does not believe it can provide an appropriate
education for a child with a disability, the school board can agree to a proper
private school placement. Alternatively, dissatisfied parents can unilaterally
withdraw their child from the inappropriate public school, place the child in
a private school of their choice, and' challenge the school's IEP as
inappropriate under the Act. In that situation, if the parents were successful
in the lawsuit, the courts could require the district to pay for the appropriate
education in the private school from the time of that decision. But the issue
remained: who would be financially responsible for the interim period-the
time between the parents' appeal and initial private placement, and the judge's
final decision? Would a defaulting school district be obligated to reimburse
the parents retroactively, or would the parents be solely responsible for any
violation of the stay put clause while their case was pending?
The stay-put provision was first litigated in the Fourth Circuit. In
Stemple v. Board of Education of Prince George's County,"a and later in
Rowe v. Henry County School Board,43 the court held a plaintiff's parents
who unilaterally elected to send their child to a private school while appealing
placement were under a duty not to remove the child from the school until a
final determination was made. In finding this duty, the court admitted to
reading the section 1415(e)(3) requirement literally. "Of course, that duty
may not be totally enforceable by the state, but it certainly negates any right

38. See generallyJerry R. Parkinson, Parents'UnilateralPlacement of a Disabled
Child in an UnapprovedPrivateSchool, 76 EDUc. L. REP. 893 (1992).
39. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (Supp. V 1993).
40. The IDEA requires that, "to the maximum extent appropriate" children with
disabilities are to be educated with children who are not disabled. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(5)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Further, removal of a child from such environment is
to occur "only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in

regular classes... cannot be achieved satisfactorily." Id.
41. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(5), 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993). See also
34 C.F.R. §§ 300.349, 300.400-.487 (1993); S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 32,
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1456.
42. 623 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1980).
43. 718 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1983).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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on the part of parents... to elect unilaterally to place their child in private
school and recover the tuition costs thus incurred.""
Although several courts followed the holding in Stemple,45 the Supreme
Court disagreed with this analysis.. The Court faced the issue of retroactive
reimbursement for unilateral parental placements in Town of Burlington v.
Department of Education." The case involved Michael Panico, a learning
disabled third grade student in the public schools of Burlington,
Massachusetts. 7 It began in 1979, when Michael's parents challenged the
school's IEP and, after mediation failed, placed him in a state-approved
48
private school, specially designed for children with learning disabilities.
The state's appeals board decided the district's proposed placement was
inappropriate for Michael under the IDEA and ordered the town of Burlington
to pay the cost of Michael's tuition and transportation, as well as reimburse
the Panicos for their private school expenses during the appeal.49 The school
district appealed to the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, naming the Panicos and the Massachusetts Department of
Education as defendants.50
After years of appeals, remands, and transfers, 5 the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit ruled for the Panicos on the issue of reimbursement. The

44. Stemple, 623 F.2d at 897.
45. See, e.g., Rowe v. Henry County Sch. Bd., 718 F.2d 115, 118-19 (4th Cir.
1983); Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 809-12 (1st Cir. 1982); Miener v. Missouri, 673
F.2d 969, 980 (8th Cir. 1982); Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 598 (8th Cir.
1981); Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205, 1209-14 (7th Cir. 1981). See also
Mountain View-Los Altos United High Sch. Dist. v. Sharon B.H., 709 F.2d 28, 29
(9th Cir. 1983).
But see Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773,797-99 (1st
Cir. 1984), af'd,471 U.S. 359 (1985); Doe v. Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910,
920-21 (1st Cir. 1983) (stating in dictum that "permitting reimbursement promotes the
purpose and policy of the Act"); Blomstrom v. Massachusetts Bd. of Educ., 532 F.

Supp. 707, 713 (D. Mass. 1982); William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505, 512 (N.D. 111.
1982); Fosterv. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 523 F. Supp. 1142 (D.D.C. 1981);
Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981), aft'd, 703 F.2d 823 (5th Cir.
1983).
46.
47.
48.
49.

471 U.S. 359 (1985).
Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 363.

50. Id.
51. Burlington,736 F.2d at 778-79. Michael's case beganwith an administrative
appeal filed in 1979. Id. at 779. The First Circuit released its second opinion in the
case in 1984, id. at 773, and the Supreme Court affirmed the following April.
Burlington, 471 U.S. at 359.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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court held, inter alia, if at final judgment the school's IEP provided an
inappropriate education for Michael, the parent's unilateral placement in a
private school would not bar reimbursement. 2 The court based its finding
on the conclusion that the stay-put provision of section 1415(e)(3) is
"directory rather than mandatory" and should not be followed literally where

it directly clashes with the overall goal of appropriate education. 3 In
holding that the court in Stemple incorrectly exalted form over substance, the
court relied on the Act's legislative history and structure, as well as the
"purposes of the Act as a whole." 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari5 to consider two issues: whether
the type of relief provided for in the Act allows retroactive reimbursement to
parents for private school placement and whether the stay-put provision bars
such reimbursement to parents who unilaterally place their child in a private
school without the consent of the local school officials.
Addressing the first issue, the Court held such reimbursement was
allowed under the Act's broad conference of power on a reviewing court.5"
In a case where a court determines that a private placement desired by the
parents was proper under the Act and that an IEP calling for placement in
a public school was inappropriate, it seems clear beyond cavil that
"appropriate" relief would include a prospective injunction directing the
school officials to develop and implement at public expense an IEP placing
the child in a private school.57
Thus, the Court held retroactive reimbursement was appropriate relief
available in the proper case. In reaching this decision, the Court emphasized
the conflict between the purposes of the Act and the lengthy determination
process provided for in the Act.58 Since a final judicial decision would most
likely come "a year or more after the school term covered by the IEP has

52. Burlington, 736 F.2d at 798.
53. Id. at 797-98.
54. Id. at 797. The court stated that to hold the "stay-put" provision as binding
on a dissatisfiedparent would "not only [be] contrary to the explicit legislative history
of the (e)(3) provision, but [it would] treat these special needs children as though they
were nonperishable commodities able to be warehoused until the termination of in rem
proceedings." Id. at 798.
55. 469 U.S. 1071 (1984).
56. "The statute directs the court to 'grant such relief as [it] determines is
appropriate.' The ordinary meaning of these words confers broad discretion on the
court." Burlington,471 U.S. at 369 (interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988)).
57. Id. at 370.
58. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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passed," 9 parents who disagree with the IEP face an unenviable decision:
leave their child where they do not think he or she belongs, or place the
child-at their own, often great, expense-in a private educational setting.6"
If they choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who have
adequate means and who are reasonably confident of their assessment
normally would, it would be an empty victory to have a court tell them
several years later that they were right but that these expenditures could not
in a proper case be reimbursed by the school officials. . . . Because
Congress undoubtedly did not intend this result, we are confident that by
empowering the court to grant "appropriate" relief Congress meant to
include retroactive reimbursement to parents as an available remedy in a
proper case.6'

As to the second issue, the Court held a violation of the stay-put clause
of the Act does not subject a parentto a waiver of this right to reimbursement.
"The provision says nothing about financial responsibility, waiver, or parental
right to reimbursement at the conclusion of judicial proceedings."'62 The
Court observed a unilateralprivate placement, by definition, implies the school
district disagrees with the parents' view of their child's education. Therefore,
it is unlikely the school will agree to an interim private placement while the
parents appeal the school's determination. To interpret the provision to deny
the parental right to reimbursement would defeat the "principal purpose of the
Act," namely to provide children with disabilities an appropriate and free
education.6' In light of this overall purpose, and the remedy provision of
section 1415(e)(2) allowing the award of "such relief as the court determines

59. Id.
60. Id.

61. Id.
62. Id. at 372.
63. Id. at 373. Under § 1415(e)(3), the child shall remain in his or her current
placement, "unliss the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian
otherwise agree." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1988).
The Court quoted the same legislative history language as did the First Circuit

in Burlington and Brookline.
We [the Congressional conference committee] did feel, however, that the
placement, or change of placement should not be unnecessarily delayed
while long and tedious administrative appeals were being exhausted. Thus
the conference adopted a flexible approach to try to meet the needs of both
the child and the State.
121 CoNG. Rac. 37,412 (1975) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

11

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 8

MISSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 60

is appropriate," the Court held upheld the equitable award of
reimbursement."
The Court stressed, however, the provision of section 1415(e)(3) would
still have a significant effect on parents' decisions. Essentially, parents who
unilaterally remove their child from the state's educational placement "do so
at their own financial risk."65 The allowance of reimbursement is dependant
upon a court's determination of the IEP's appropriateness. A determination
in favor of the school's plan would subsequently bar any claim for
reimbursement for the child's interim placement." In addition, the Court did
not determine whether this reimbursement award would be automatic if the
parents were victorious in court. The court below called reimbursement
"equitable relief, committed to the sound discretion of the district court."'67
The Supreme Court expressly reserved decision on this question, stating only
"[w]e do think that the [First Circuit] was correct in concluding that
['appropriate' relief] means that equitable considerations are relevant in
fashioning relief."'

C. The Question of Carter
After Burlington, it is clear that parents can be reimbursed for unilateral
interim placement of their child in a private school. Although the prospect
involves risk, the door was opened for dissatisfied parents to challenge their
child's placement and, at the same time, provide for the child what they
believed was a truly proper education. But the facts in Burlington limited its
holding to parents who place their children in state-approvedprivatefacilities.
The significant issue of whether the IDEA would permit reimbursement of
expenses for unilateralparental placementin a private school not pre-approved
under state standards was left to the lower courts to decide, until that very
issue confronted the Supreme Court in FlorenceCounty School DistrictFour
v. Carter.'
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in two separate cases prior to
Carter." The first was Antkowiak v. Ambach.71 The Antkowiak court
noted the Act defines FAPE as "special education and related services

64. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374.
65. Id. at 373-74.
66. Ad.
67. Burlington, 736 F.2d at 801.
68. Burlington,471 U.S. at 374.
69. 114 S. Ct. 361, 364 (1993).
70. Tucker v. Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist., 873 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1989);
Antkowiak by Antkowiak v. Ambaoh, 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1988).
71. 838 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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that... meet the standards of the state educational agency." 2 In addition,
the court held the Act clearly provides that a FAPE may be found in a private
school or facility at no cost to parents 3 but, following the language of
section 1413(a)(4)(B)(ii), "in all such instances the [s]tate educational agency
shall determine whether such schools and facilities meet standards that apply
to [s]tate and local educational agencies." 4
Just over a year later, the same court followed Antkowiak in a precise

reading of the IDEA's language. The court in Tucker v. Bay Shore Union
Free School District5 held "a placement in an unapproved school, whether
by school officials or through unilateral action by parents, cannot be
considered 'proper under the Act."'1 6 Thus, despite the fact that the private
school met the child's educational needs, 7 reimbursement of the parents'
Since, under Burlington, section 1415(e)(2) of the Act
cost was denied.'
only allows equitable reimbursement when the court finally determines the
private placement is appropriate, such reimbursement would not be proper. 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the
analysis of Antkowiak and Tucker in Carterv. FlorenceCounty School District
0 The court first held, under section 1415(e)(2) and its interpretation
Four."
in Burlington, reimbursement in the case before it was permissible.8 ' Next,
the court rejected the school district's argument that the mere fact the child's
placement by her parents in a non-approved private school was not
pre-approved by state officials was fatal to her reimbursement claim.' Such

72. Id.at 639 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)(B) (1988)).
73. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993)).
74. Id. (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(ii) (1988)). The court further held
against the parents in denying the district court's injunction to order state officials to

place their child in an unapproved school. Id. at 640-41. Apparently, parents cannot
force the state to place a child in anunapproved school, but after Cartertheycan gain

reimbursement from a unilateral placement in such a setting. It appears, in this
situation, a parent is forced to take the risk the Court described in Burlington. Though

it is beyond the scope of this Note, it may be worthy to consider whether Carter
mandates a change in this area as well. Instead of the parents taking the initial risk
of unilateral withdrawal of their child, should they not be able to force the school
district to place their child in an appropriate educational setting, whether or not it is

approved by the state?
75. 873 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1989).
76. Id. at 568.
77. Id. at 564.
78. Id. at 568.
79. Id.
80. 950 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1991), affd sub nom. 114 S. Ct. 361 (1993).

81. Id. at 161.
82. Id. at 161-62.
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a reading of the statute-that reimbursement is available only for3
state-approved private schools-in the court's opinion was clearly wrong.
Reading the provisions of section 1413(a)(4)(B) as a whole, the court found
the section's requirement that "private schools receiving funds under the Act
meet state educational standards, would apply only when the child is placed
in the private school by the state or local school system."' In light of the
fact that the legislative history provides no indication to the contrary, the court
concluded "that the Act itself simply imposes no requirement that the private85
school be approved by the state in parent-placement reimbursement cases."
While expressing its difference with the Fourth Circuit in Tucker, the
court held rather than state approval, the standard for appropriateness for a
unilateral private placement under the Act was the standard used in Rowley for
approval of an IEP: "a private school placement is 'proper under the Act' if
the education provided by the private school is 'reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits."' 86 According to the court,
such flexibility is inherent in the broad equitable powers granted to the courts
in section 1415(e)(2) and essential to supporting the Act's purpose of
providing the best education possible for all disabled children. When a school
fails in its statutory duty to provide a FAPE for a child, requiring state
approval of the parents' choice of private schools would present an anomalous
situation.
[I]t hardly seems consistent with the Act's goals to forbid parents from
educating their [children at the school of their choice] "simply because that
school lacks the stamp of approval of the same public school system that
failed to meet the child's needs in the first place."87
Recognizing that the court in Carterexpressly contradicted the Second
Circuit in Tucker, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of state
approval, and affirmed the opinion of the Fourth Circuit.89

83. Id. at 162.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 163 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). See also Burlington, 471 U.S.
at 369-70 (allowing interim reimbursement for unilateral placements by parents if,
upon final judgment, a court determines that such placement is "proper under the
Act"). The court in Tucker stated that a non-approved placement was not "proper
under the Act" because it would violate § 1401(a)(18)(B) (1988) of the Act. Tucker,
873 F.2d at 568.
87. Carter,950 F.2d at 164.
88. 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993)
89. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 362.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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III. FACTS AND HOLDING

After attending a private school from grades two through six, Shannon
Carter re-entered the public school system in the fall of 1982.90 Because of
her poor performance in the seventh grade at Timmonsville School, the
Florence County School District Four tested her twice for potential learning
disabilities. The district concluded although she scored below average, she
was not learning disabled. 9 In 1985, at her parents' request, Shannon was
again tested by a psychologist who concluded Shannon was indeed learning
disabled. 2 Thus began the proceedings that ultimately took Shannon and her
family to the United States Supreme Court.
As required by the IDEA,' after determining Shannon had a learning
disability, school officials met with her parents to formulate her individualized
education program.94 The Carters were dissatisfied with the school's plan
and requested a due process hearing challenging the program's
appropriateness.95 Both the local educational officer and a state educational
agency hearing held the school's IEP adequate,96 rejecting the Carters' claim
that it failed to provide a free appropriate public education. 7
While the case was pending in the fall of 1985, Shannon's parents placed
her in Trident Academy ("Trident"), a private school in Mt. Pleasant, South
Carolina that specializes in learning disabled education. She remained there
until graduation in the spring of 1988.8 Trident had not been approved as

a school for learning disabled students by the state of South Carolina.
90. Carter,950 F.2d at 158.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988).
94. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1988); Shannon's initial IEP, proposed by the
school, provided that she spend at least two periods per day in a resource room (while
remaining in regular classes the rest of the day). Carter,950 F.2d at 158-59. After
considering the Carters' dispute and suggestion of a "learning disabilities itinerant
program" that would provide for individualized instruction from a special education
teacher, the school district modified its plan. Id. at 159. The IEP adopted on May 2,
1985 placed Shannon in such an itinerant program three periods per week with
individualized instruction. Id. She was to spend the remainder of the week in regular
classes. Id. It was this plan that her parents appealed. Id.
95. Carter,950 F.2d at 159. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (1988) ("Whenever a
complaint has been received ... the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for
an impartial due process hearing which shall be conducted ... as determined by State
law or by the State educational agency.").
96. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 363.
97. Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1988).
98. Carter,950 F.2d at 159.
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Further, Shannon's parents never requested approval for her placement in
Trident from the State Department of Education, nor was it ever granted.
Nevertheless, several public school districts in South Carolina had previously
placed
learning disabled students in Trident as part of an individual child's
99
IEP.
Shannon's parents filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of South Carolina in July 1986, alleging the school district breached
its statutory duty to provide Shannon with a free appropriate education and
praying for actual damages for reimbursement of costs incurred."' 0 After a
bench trial, the court held for the parents, ruling the school district's proposed
IEP was "wholly inadequate" and that, while it did not comply procedurally
with the Act, Trident "provided Shannon an excellent education in substantial
compliance with all the substantive requirements" of the IDEA.10 '
Further, and more significantly, the court held "[n]othing in the existing
law or regulations barred reimbursement simply because the State Department
of Education had not approved Shannon's placement by her parents at the
Trident Academy."'"
Under the equitable relief provisions of the
IDEA, '3 the court awarded the Carters $35,716.11 plus prejudgment interest
for tuition, fees, room and board, mileage to school, and four trips home per
year during her three years at Trident.'

99. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 363. Trident had not been granted comprehensive
approval by the state board of eduction because it employed uncertified teachers and
did not conform procedurally to IDEA or the requirements of the IEP. Id. at 365.
However, Florence County School District had placed children with disabilities at
Trident in the past. Id. at 366.
100. Carter, 950 F.2d at 159. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1988) grants jurisdiction to
the district courts of the United States for appeal by an aggrieved party to the agency
due process hearing.
101. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 364. Under the school district's adopted IEP, Shannon
was to spend three hours aweek in individualized instruction and the remainder of the
week in the regular classroom. The IEP set goals of four month's reading and math
progress during the school year. Carter, 950 F.2d at 159.
In contrast, under Trident's program, Shannonwas evaluated quarterly (not yearly
as required by IDEA), and with the benefit of low teacher student ratios experienced

"significant progress." For example, her reading comprehension rose more than three
grade levels in her three years at the school. Id. See also infra notes 120-21 and
accompanying text.

102. Carter,950 F.2d at 159-60.
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1988). The section grants jurisdiction over ]EP
disputes to the district courts of the United States and allows them to "grant suchrelief
as the court determines is appropriate." Id.
104. Carter,950 F.2d at 160.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8
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The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. 105 The court
agreed with the district court in its finding that the school's proposed IEP was
inadequate and "unlikely to permit [Shannon] to advance from grade to grade
with passing marks."1 6 The court held "[t]he Act itself simply imposes no
requirement that the private school be approved by the state in parent-

placement reimbursement cases."'

7

Instead, Congress intended section

08

1413(a)(4)(B) of the IDEA," which requires private schools receiving
funds under the Act to meet state educational standards, to apply only when

the student is directly placed in the private school by the state or local school
system. 9 "[W]hen a public school system has defaulted on its obligations
under the Act, a private school placement is 'proper under the Act' if the
education provided by the private school is 'reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits.""' 0 The court held the Act
provides for reimbursement for private school placement of a disabled child
when (1) "the program proposed by the state failed to provide the child a free
appropriate public education" and (2) "the private school in which the child
is enrolled succeeded in providing an appropriate education.""'

105. Id. at 165.
106. Id. at 160. This finding by the district court followed the minimum
standards set by Rowley, namely that the IEP must be "reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
207 (1982). The modest IEP established by the school district set a goal of four
months progress over a school year and a month. Carter,950 F.2d at 159. While
under Rowley, advancing from grade to grade with passing marks is not dispositive as
to the reasonably calculated standard, it is "one important factor in determining
educational benefit." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 "n.28. According to the district court
and the court of appeals, Rowley was clearly violated, the only issue of the case on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court was the issue of reimbursement. Carter,
114 S. Ct. at 365.
107. Carter,950 F.2d at 162.
108. In pertinent part, § 1413(a)(4)(B) states
(i) handicapped children in private schools and facilities will be provided
special education and related services ...

at no cost to their parents or

guardian, if such children are placed in or referred to such schools or
facilities by the State or appropriatelocaleducationalagency... ; and (ii)
in all such instances, the State educational agency shall determine whether

such schools and facilities meet standards that apply to State and local
educational agencies and that children so served have all the rights they
would have is served by such agencies.
20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).
109. Carter,950 F.2d at 162.
110. Id. at 163 (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207).
111. Id. at 164.
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari". to resolve the
conflict among the courts of appeals and to address a single narrow question:
"[W]hether Shannon's parents are barred from reimbursement because the
private school in which Shannon enrolled did not meetthe section 1401(a)(18)
definition of a 'free appropriate public education.""' 3 The Court held they
were not, stating the requirements of section 1401(a)(18) do not apply to
unilateral parental placements."' To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would
eliminate the parental right to unilateral withdrawal of their child the Court
had recognized previously in Burlington."5

The Court held in favor of parents who unilaterally withdraw their child
from a public school that provides an inappropriate education under the IDEA.
If the parents, in turn, place their child in private school setting that, while not
meeting all the requirements of the IDEA, provides a substantially proper
education, a court may order the state to reimburse the parents for all tuition
and expenses.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In affirming the Fourth Circuit, Justice O'Connor, writing for a
unanimous Supreme Court, found parents who unilaterally place their child in
an appropriate private school while an appeal is pending are not barred from
reimbursement." 6 However, such reimbursement is available only if a
federal court concludes the public school's proposed IEP was inappropriate
and the parents' private school election was proper under the standards of the
IDEA." 7 Because the IDEA mandates the public education system provide
a FAPE to every disabled child, the school district's allegation that having to
pay for a unilateral private placement would place a significant burden on the
state was unfounded. "[P]ublic educational authorities who want to avoid
reimbursing parents for the private education of a disabled child can do one
of two things: Give the child a free appropriate public education in a public
setting or8 place the child in an appropriate private setting of the State's
choice.""
In light of the ultimate goals of the IDEA, the Court found it would be
inconsistent with Burlington to restrict reimbursement only to parents who

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993).
Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 365. See supra note 12.
Carter,114 S.Ct. at 365.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366.
Id.
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place their child in private schools that meet state standards. 9 In Shannon
Carter's case, it was readily apparent that the private school provided her with
an "excellent education in substantial compliance with all the substantive
requirements" of the Act, although it was not precisely in compliance with
several of its procedural details' 20 In fact, the trial court found Shannon's
education was of higher quality, and that she made more significant progress
than she would have made had she remained in the Florence County public
schools."'
The IDEA was intended to provide children with disabilities an education
that was free and appropriate as defined in section 1401(a)(18) of the Act.
However, contrary to the Second Circuit's decision in Tucker, the Court held
the precise requirements of section 1401(a)(18) cannot apply to unilateral
private placements. Specifically, section 1401(a)(18)(A) requires the FAPE
be provided under public supervision and section 1401(a)(18)(B) requires the
school to meet overall state educational standards. According to the Court, to
require a parent to meet these standards would not make sense in a case, like
the Carters', where the parents were placing their child in a private school
over the objection of the public school district. Such approval by the state
would require it to cooperate with the parents with whom they are fighting in
the courts. "Accordingly, to read the section 1401(a)(18) requirements as
applying to parental placements would effectively eliminate the right of
unilateral withdrawal recognized in Burlington."
As further evidence in support of its position, the Court noted in states

like South Carolina where state approval of a private placement is on a case
by case basis (with no comprehensive public list of approved schools), the
parents would need the cooperation of the state even before they could know
if their selected school met state educational standards. "As we recognized in
Burlington, such cooperation is unlikely in cases where the school officials
disagree with the need for the private placement.""
Therefore, the Court

119. Id. at 365.
120. Id. at 363. Although Trident was accredited by the Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools, the Carters never sought approval for Shannon's placement from
the state department of education. Previously, however, Trident had accepted and
enrolled students sent on recommendation by the public school system. Carter,950
F.2d at 159. Trident never attempted to comply with the letter of the IDEA. Id. at
161. Although it never used the term IEP, the school set goals for its students and
reviewed them four times a year, more than is required by the IDEA. Id. However,
at least two faculty members at Trident were not certified by the state and thus, argued
the school district, precluded any possible pre-approval of Shannon's placement. Id.
121. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 363.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 366.
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in
held "[t]o read the provisions of section 1401(a)(18) to bar reimbursement
24
the circumstances of this case would defeat [the statute's purpose].'W
The Court rejected the holding of Tucker, concluding that non-approval
by the state of a parent-selected private school program for their child's
education would not in itself serve as a complete bar to state
reimbursement." Instead, consistent with Burlington, a court is to use the
broad grant of discretionary power found in section 1415(e)(2) to fashion
equitable relief on a case-by-case basis, considering all relevant factors." 6
The Court noted, although South Carolina kept no publicly available list of
state approved private schools, the absence of such a list was not essential to
its holding." However, the Court implied such a list would be helpful to
the state's case as it would eliminate much guesswork on the part of the
parents. Since South Carolina provided no list, its private placements were
approved on a case by case basis, requiring the parent to cooperate with state
officials before they knew if the school they chose was state-approved. In
light of the disagreementbetween the parents and the school district, the Court
stated such cooperation is "unlikely." '
In addition, a court is to consider the level of reimbursement prayed for
in making its determination. Total reimbursement is not to be provided if a
court determines the cost of the private education was not appropriate and
reasonable. 9 The Court further noted parents who unilaterally change their
child's placement while review proceedings continue do so at their own risk.
If the parents are unable to show the public school's IEP was inappropriate
and, in turn, the private school placement is appropriate, then the parents will
not recover.interim reimbursement. 3 ° At least until Congress commands
otherwise, "that risk is simply one factor that the parents must consider in
deciding where to educate their child."'' In the meantime, if the parents
gamble and win, they have a right to be reimbursed for the risk they took.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carter,950 F.2d at 164.
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V. COMMENT
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life ifhe is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
provide
132
terms.
Twenty one years passed from the time Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote
these words in Brown v. Board of Eduction133 until Congress addressed the
issue in the context of children with disabilities. Acting under the premise set
out in Brown, and reiterated in Mills v. Board of Education of District of
Columbia,"' Congress embarked on a mission to equalize the education
offered disabled students to that offered all students. After hearing the
testimony of more than 100 legislators, parents, and educators on the local,
state, and national level, Congress, in the form of the IDEA, decided to take
a "more active role under its responsibility for equal protection of the laws to
guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational
opportunity."1 35 Now, almost twenty years have passed since Congress
codified this ambitious and worthy goal in the IDEA. By no fault of the
states, crippled by financial constraints, or of the children themselves, asking
only the opportunity to be educated equally with their peers, it appears
Congress has summarily failed. 36
Such failure can be sufficiently illustrated by considering the ultimate
impact of the line of cases that culminated in Carter. Although the Carter
Court's legal reasoning is sound and its decision correctin light of the IDEA's
language and purpose, the solution it requires- that schools pay for unilateral
placements by dissatisfied parents- creates an unwieldy burden on both states
and school districts.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Id.
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). See supranote 7.
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1433.
See generallyJoseph P. Shapiro et al., Separate and Unequal,U.S. NEWS

& WORLD REPORT, Dec. 13, 1993, at 46.

In the 18 years since [the passage of the IDEA), the good intentions have
yielded decidedly mixed results. While millions of American children have
received educations as a result of [the IDEA], the school system created
by the law hurts many of the very children it is intended to help even as it
costs taxpayers billions.
Id. at 46.
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Under Burlington parents may have a right to reimbursement for the
unilateral private placement of their child. Cartermerely took that holding
one step further by extending the right to private placements that do not
receive the state's blessing. Holding otherwise and preventing reimbursement
recovery to Shannon Carter and her parents would have effectively destroyed
her rights under the IDEA."1 Further, as the First Circuit noted in
Burlington,to hold strictly to the language of the stay-put provision would be
akin to treating special needs children as "nonperishable commodities able to
be warehoused until the termination of in rem proceedings."" 8 Without the
ability to recover reimbursement for a unilateral placement, students would be
trapped indefinitely in an environment with which they have already expressed
displeasure. Further, barring reimbursement would strip parents of their
constitutional right to educate their children as they like, 39 and barring
reimbursement based on something as arbitrary as state-approval of the private
school placement clearly elevates form over substance.Y° In light of the
language of the law, and the clear intent of the Act as a whole, the Carter
decision stands as a significant-and sound-victory for the silent minority,
the disabled child.
But the child was not the only recipient of good news in the Carter

opinion. Arguably, the Court strove to forge a compromise between two
extremes. The decision not only went a long way toward ensuring educational
rights for the disabled child, but it allayed educators and states' worst fears of
new and far-reaching obligations.
In support of the school's position, the Court did not mandate interim
reimbursement. Quite the contrary, in Burlington and now in Carter, it
specifically held that the award of retroactive interim relief should depend
upon "all relevant factors."14' No single factor should prohibit the court
from exercising its broad discretionary powers granted in section
As a result, there is no guarantee a parents who make the
1415(e)(2).'
decision to educate their child at a private school will be reimbursed even if
the school's original IEP is later deemed inadequate.
In addition to the requirements outlined in Burlingtonthat reimbursement
turns on a court's determination of the public school's proposal as
inappropriate and the private school as an appropriate environment, the court
must weigh the equities in awarding relief. For example, a parent that acts in

137. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
138. Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 798 (1st Cir.
1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
139. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
140. Carter,736 F.2d at 798.

141. Carter, 114 S. Ct. at 366.
142. See supra note 56.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8

22

1995]

Huskey: Huskey: Teaching the Children Appropriately

APPROPRIATE EDUCATION UNDER THE IDEA

bad faith in altering a child's educational environment should be denied relief
in the form of interim reimbursement. Additionally, it would appear the
state's approval or disapproval of a private placement will at least factor into
the court's decision process. Parents who decide to alter their child's
placement without the school's approval will continue to "do so at their own
financial risk.""4 3 Not only must they foot the initial bill of a private
education but, if a court rules against them, they will lose out on a claim for
reimbursement.
In addition, the CarterCourt went out of its way to say that, contrary to
the school district's (and others') belief,"' it was not imposing a significant
financial burden on the states and school districts. First, Justice O'Connor
made it clear the school need only meet its obligations under the IDEA in
order to avoid reimbursement for a unilateral private placement. "This is
IDEA's mandate, and school officials who conform to it need not worry about
'
reimbursement claims."145
Instead of anxiety, the states' hearts should be
filled with certainty: Do as the law requires and face no extra liability.

Second, any losses the schools face are limited by a standard of
reasonableness. The Court rejected any hope of a parent looking to place his
or her child in a "cadillac" school. "Total reimbursement will not be
appropriate if the court determines that the cost of the private education was
unreasonable."14
On the other hand, the Court did in fact strike a powerful blow in the
students' favor. Dissatisfied parents need not beg for state approval before
they place their children in a superior private educational environment. In
Shannon Carter's case, for example, there was no published list of preapproved private facilities so, in order to conform to the letter of the IDEA,
her parents would have been forced to solicit school approval of their chosen
institution. Such cooperation is not realistically expected from a school the
parents already consider inadequate.' 47 Further, as the Court stated in

143. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 366.
144. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief at 26-29, Carter(No.91-1523).
Education is easily the largest of all state expenditures; ...Yet having
dedicated a large portion of their revenue to educational spending, most
state governments-now facing their worst financial crisis in decades-are
ill-equipped to shoulder the extra, cost of funding for inappropriate
placements.
Id. at 27-28.

145. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 366.
146. Id.
147. See Burlington,471 U.S. at 362-63. The Court stated if the parents' failure
to obtain approval were held to bar relief, the Act's purpose would be defeated to the
extent as if reimbursement were never available. Id. School officials who disagree
with parents concerning the adequacy of the state's placement are unlikely to "agree
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Carter, it is hardly consistent with the principles of the IDEA to "forbid
parents from educating their child at a school that provides an appropriate
education simply because that school lacks the stamp of approval of the same
public school system that failed to meet the child's needs in the first
place." ' Clearly, the Court has allowed significantly more flexibility in the
parents' difficult decision.
Additionally, by reading the IDEA as it has in Burlington and Carter,
there is little doubt the Court has greatly enhanced the educational
opportunities for disabled children. Instead of waiting for a seemingly
interminable appeal process to run its course, a disabled child can be placed
immediately by his or her parents in an appropriate educational setting,
wasting the least amount of time in the all-important learning process. As the
Court pointed out in Burlington:
[c]urrent research indicates that full development of reading and other skills
will more likely occur with learning disabled children .

.

. if adequate

remedial services are provided in the early primary grades. Later
intervention generally appears to require special services over a longer
period of time to achieve a similar rate of remediation ....

Delay in

remedial teaching
is therefore likely to be highly injurious to such
149
children.
Finally, the increased likelihood of reimbursement may encourage the family
with less financial means to do without delay what they feel is best for the
child, regardless of the initial monetary commitment.
However, the concept of reimbursement for unilateral placement, while

excellent in ideal, will prove impractical in reality. Without further action by
Congress, mandates created by the IDEA and supported by decisions like
Carter will have a devastating impact on American public schools. The
Florence County School District (as well as several states and the National
League of Cities in Amicus briefs) argued that a holding for Shannon Carter
would have a long lasting and adverse impact on the already depleted coffers

to an interim private school placement while the review process runs its course." Id.
Thus, parents would be forced to choose: , either leave their child in what may be
determined later as an inappropriate placement (to the detriment of their child) or
unilaterally choose a private placement only to sacrifice any claim for reimbursement.
The former alternative could prove devastating to the child. The latter alternative
would be available only to the wealthiest of families. The Act's dual goals of
providing a free and appropriate education for all children with disabilities would be
defeated.
148. Id. at 365 (quoting Carter,950 F.2d at 164).
149. Burlington,736 F.2d at 798 (quoting 121 CONG. REC. 37,412, 37,416 (Nov.
19, 1975)).
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of state and local governments.15

Despite the assurances of the Court, 5 '

it would appear such a concern is valid. In an area where the child's concerns
should predominate, it all boils down to money.
Financial concerns are nothing new to the issue of disabled education.
In fact, it appears financial issues played a key role in the Act's genesis. As
the Court noted in Rowley, 2 the Senate's emphasis on the financial
benefits for all of society was implicit in its passage of the IDEA. "With
proper education services, many would be able to become productive citizens,
contributing to society instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others,
through such services, would increase their independence, thus reducing their
dependence on society."'53 With this cry of cost efficiency, Congress
established its most sweeping educational plan for children with disabilities
and turned the states loose, left to fend for themselves in the economically
inefficient business of educating children.
According to figures offered by the Florence County School District, the
average per pupil expenditure in the school district was $4,102.56 a year."'
The district court's order to reimburse Shannon Carter amounted to nearly
$12,000 a year.'55 The reality is, in the words of the school district,
"[e]very dollar paid to reimburse the Carters for Shannon's private education
is one less dollar available to the students of [the already poor district.]"' 5 6
The question must be addressed: How much is too much? At what point
does the cost to provide one student a reasonably calculated benefit in a
private setting outweigh the cost to a school district trying to provide the best
services possible to the most children within a tightly restricted budget?
When do the "ordinary" needs of the majority outweigh the "extraordinary"
needs of the special child?
The cost of educating the disabled child can be astronomical. In 1989,
the U.S. Department of Education reported to Congress that the average
expenditure for the average pupil in a school district resource program was

150. See Petitioner's Brief at 26-29, Carter(No. 91-1523). Similar arguments
were maintained in amnicus curiae briefs of the National School Boards Association,
the National Association of State Boards of Education, the National League of Cities,

the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the Council of State Governments, the National
Association of Counties, the International City/County Management Association, the
National Governors' Association, the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers as
well as the joint brief of 17 states.
151. See supranotes 141-46 and accompanying text.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 n.23 (1982).
S.REP. No. 168, supra note 3, at 9, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1433.
Petitioner's Brief at 26, Carter (No. 91-1523).
Id. at 27.

156. Id.
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$2,398 for a year of instruction." 7 In a self-contained program, the district
would pay $5,700 a year,' and a student in a private residential program
cost $31,616 a year.5 9
Furthermore, the 1989 report indicated the national average total cost for
a full-time student in the regular classroom was $2,780 a year. 6 ° In sharp
contrast, for fiscal year 1992, the average federal contribution under the IDEA
was about $409 per child each year.'61 Although the IDEA indicates a
Congressional willingness to fund the Act at a level as high as forty percent
of a state's average expenditure per child,' today just seven percent of the
With
children with disabilities cost is repaid by the federal government.
close to 5 million children under the aegis of the Act in the 1990-91 school
year,"M the remaining, unfunded ninety-three percent is no small burden.
65
In a practical sense, it may be a burden impossible for the states to meet.
As Justice O'Connor wrote, there is no doubt the financial burden of
paying reimbursement costs can be easily avoided by a state that merely
conforms to the mandate of the IDEA: "[G]ive the child a free appropriate
157. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDUCATION OF TE HANDIcAPPED AcT

119, 127
158.
159.
160.
161.

(1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
U.S. DPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, INDIVIDUALS WiTH DIsABILrris
EDUCATION ACT: PROGRAM-FUNDED ACTIVITIES, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 4 (1992).
162. 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(1)(B)(v) (1988); See also S. REP. No. 168, supranote
3, at 16, U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1439.

[T]he [Committee on Labor and Public Welfare] wished to provide, on a
per-handicapped child basis, a reasonable dollar amount which relates to
actual dollars spent on handicapped children, and which could assist the
State in paying for part of the cost of educating each child. Studies done
by the National Education Finance Project estimated that the actual cost of
educating a handicapped child is on the average, double the cost of
educating a non-handicapped child.

Id.
163. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, JUSTIFICATION OF APPROPRIATION
ESTIMATES TO TE CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR 1993 F-19 (1992).
164. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGREsS ON TE IMLEMENTATION OF TE INDIVIDUALS WlTH DISABILrmS
EDUCATION ACT xvii (1992).
165. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiaeof National School Boards Association and
the National Association of State Boards of Education at 27-28, Carter(No. 91-1523)
("Special education expenditures have risenfrom approximately $11.75 billion in 19821983 to over $16 billion in 1986-1987, with the federal government picking up only
slightly more than $1 billion.").
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public education in a public setting, or place the child in an appropriate
private setting of the State's choice." '66 However, there are several
problems with this apparently obvious solution. First, funding a FAPE for a
special child is often cost prohibitive for a financially strapped school district.
Second, even if the school complies to the letter of the IDEA, it faces the
increasingly likely prospect of defending against challenges from concerned
parents and, in turn, the long term expenses of litigation and appeal.
Finally, and most significantly, in order to win an IEP challenge, the
parents need only demonstrate their child did not receive an appropriate
education in the public system. In practice, that would not appear to be such
a difficult burden to meet. Shannon Carter went from a public school to an
special need-intensive private setting. Is it any wonder her progress increased
dramatically? By what standard is a judge to determine appropriateness of an
education: from the dry statistics and reports offered by the school district
and its experts or the demonstration of significant improvement of a child
plaintiff standing before the court? Clearly, it would be difficult to tell a
child, like Shannon Carter, to leave a private setting that offers much more
individual attention and room for advancement among her true peers and
return to the public school; even if it is "appropriate" under the IDEA, where
she stands out as a special child and can not hope for nearly as much personal
benefit. Thus, it would appear that a student challenging his or her IEP from
the stimulating environment of a unilateral private placement is more likely
than not to be awarded reimbursement. In turn, such increased likelihood may
lead to increased IEP challenges requesting private placement and the cost of
educating the disabled child will likely increase significantly beyond a state's
ability to pay."
VI. CONCLUSION
The future .of disabled education is not so clear in a post-Burlington
world. Under Rowley, it is clear that no child with a disability in America is
guaranteed free access to education commensurate with his or her full
potential. However, every student is guaranteed some level of a free,
appropriate, public education. That guarantee continues to appear more and
more illusory. In light of Carter,it is time Congress either rethink the FAPE
standards it has created in the interests of the disabled child, or finally

166. Carter,114 S. Ct. at 366.
167. See generally Thomas Toch, Beating the System, U.S. NEWS & WoLD
REPORT, Dec. 13, 1993, at 56 (citing a Pennsylvania study that shows 25% of requests
for IEP hearings demand private placement, and "[n]ationally, 100,000 students, 2
percent of the special ed population, are in private programs" making private
placements "by far the most expensive sector of special education").
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reaffirm its commitment to financially support the states to whom it has
unfairly shifted the burden of the IDEA. Until Congress meets its funding
mandate and supports the states financially, and until states have a clear
definition of FAPE that judges may consistently follow, the worthy goals
created by Brown and enacted by the IDEA will continue to go unfulfilled.
TiMoTHY M. HUSKEY

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss1/8

28

